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On the morning of January 10, 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, 
the chief opponent to the government of Nicaraguan President 
Anastasio Garcia Somoza, began his usual drive through the 
streets of Managua, still ravished from an enormous earthquake 
six years earlier. SUddenly, a green pickup truck obstructed the 
path of his Saab, and forced Chamorro to the curb of the road.' 
Three gunmen then jumped out of the truck, carrying a machine gun 
and a rifle and proceeded to fire eighteen shots into the car at 
point-blank range, pummelling Chamorro. 2 This incident resulted 
in a watershed for American Foreign policy towards Nicaragua. 
Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning in the united states 
Department of State under President Jimmy carter, stated that 
after Chamorrp's death, "Nicaragua began to emerge from the ranks 
of small Central American nations with whose dictators the Carter 
administration had an uncomfortable, ambiguous relationship.~,3 
Looking back on the situation, questions remain. Why, under 
Carter, did the united States initially support Somoza, a man 
notorious for human rights abuses? Furthermore, what events 
caused a change in policy, toward Nicaragua, and how real was 
that change? The events in Nicaragua between 1977-1979, indicate 
that the Carter Administration based its foreign policy, not on a 
new approach, human rights, but rather on an old obsession -­
order and stability. This obsession can also be seen in u.S. 
policy toward Nicaragua in the early part of the century. While 
some Carter Administration officials concerned themselves more 
with issues of human rights, and democracy, they clashed, with 
2 
those more concerned with order, stability, protection of u.s. 
property, and communism. This struggle proved detrimental to the 
administration's policy toward Nicaragua. 
In recent years there have been many works pUblished on the 
Sandinistas and the fall of the Somoza dynasty. Few works center 
on the change in u.s. policy toward Nicaragua. Two stand out: 
Condemned to Repetition, by Robert Pastor, and Lake's Somoza 
Falling. Pastor served as a policy expert toward Nicaragua for 
the National security council, (NSC) under carter. 4 These books 
do not delve deeply into the ironies and contradictions of the 
Carter Administration's foreign policy (due probably to their 
close association with the administration). Furthermore, they do 
not look into the early history of Nicaragua, in particular, the 
rise to power of the Somoza dynasty. It remains crucial to look 
at the u.s. foreign policy toward Nicaragua not only for 
understanding the current situation in that country, but also to 
gain insight on foreign policy in general. But, in order to 
understand fully the circumstances surrounding the Carter 
Administration's policy vis-a-vis Nicaragua, one must consider 
the ascent of the Somoza dynasty.5 
THE EARLY YEARS - 1823-1927 CIVIL WAR AND THE ENTRANCE OP THE 
UNITED STATES 
The united states' entrance into Nicaragua began in 1848. 
At this time the British maintained a foothold in the country, 
around the Mosquito Coast. In 1848 miners discovered gold in 
California. This in turn created a u.s. desire to secure 
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transportation routes across Central America to the Pacific 
Coast. The subsequent desire led in 1850 to the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty, which assured that any canal or railroad across the 
Central American isthmus would be under joint u.s. and British 
control. 6 
In 1855, William Walker went to Nicaragua at the request of 
the Liberals, and helped to defeat the Conservative government. 
He proceeded to name himself president, legalize slavery, and 
make English the official language. To Nicaraguans, Walker 
embodied everything hated about the United states. Nicaragua 
never forgot the "invasion" of Walker. 7 For the next thirty-six 
years, the Conservatives controlled Nicaragua. 
stability, of sorts, sYmbolized the early years of the 
Conservative reign. The Conservatives constructed railroads, 
began operating gold mines, and attracted European immigrants 
into the country. Most importantly for the economy, an agrarian 
reform took place which expanded coffee production, and 
introduced bananas. 8 
Prosperity increased United states interest in Nicaragua. 
North American banana growers (led by the Standard Fruit Company, 
and united Fruit Company) began to lay the foundations which 
eventually led to their notorious domination in the twentieth 
century. In addition, the building of the Panama Canal made 
Nicaragua important to u.s. interests, as the only alternative 
canal route. 9 
Fear over U.S. expansion through the region, prompted 
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Liberal General, Jose Santos Zelaya to oust the Conservatives 
from power in 1893. 10 Zelaya ruled for the next sixteen years, 
often at odds with the United States. Zelaya firmly believed in 
Central American union, a type of United States of Central 
America, and saw the U.S. as an immediate threat to his 
interests. 11 
The less-than-amicable relations continued. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, Zelaya began to turn his regime into an 
open dictatorship, and began to modernize his armed forces. 12 
In addition to repression, Zelaya perpetuated his reign through 
rigged elections. He promised elections, and delivered, though 
according to one account, "voters were once given their choice of 
three candidates, 'Jose, Santos, or Zelaya. ",13 By 1900, it 
became clear to U.S. policy makers that only force could remove 
Zelaya from power. 
Nicaraguans assumed that the united States would build a 
canal in their country. Thus, in 1902 when the U.S. decided on 
Panama as the canal site, Nicaragua suffered a major setback. 
U.S. - Nicaraguan relations continued to decline rapidly. Zelaya 
turned to the Japanese to build a canal. In addition, Zelaya 
started canceling U.S. concessions in the country, and began to 
turn to countries such as Great Britain for loans. When in 1907 
Nicaragua attacked Honduras and began to display its desire to be 
a major actor in Central America, the United States decided to 
remove Zelaya. 14 
In October of 1909, Juan J. Estrada, the military Commander 
•
•
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at Bluefields, led four-hundred Conservatives into revolution 
against Zelaya and the Liberals. 15 The United states under 
President Theodore Roosevelt, responded by sending four hundred 
U.s. Marines into the region. 16 Zelaya managed to seal his own 
fate in the revolution by capturing and executing two American 
citizens who Estrada had hired to set mines and blow up Zelaya's 
troopships. The executions of American citizens, "gave the 
united states the excuse it wanted to break openly with the 
Zelaya regime. ,,17 The U. s. broke off all diplomatic relations 
with Zelaya and on August 20, 1910, Juan Estrada who was 
immediately recognized by the U.s., took over the reigns of 
Nicaragua, and Adolfo Diaz became Vice-President. 18 
Estrada pursued a policy which weakened rather than 
strengthened his hold on the government. He created three 
centers of power: The Ministry of War, headed by General Luiz 
Mena, The Ministry of the Interior, headed by Jose Maria Moncada, 
and Leadership of the Assembly, which went to Emiliano Chamorro. 
Estrada intended these positions as rewards for his top aides, 
but in reality this caused a struggle for power. 19 
Realizing his power base weakened, Estrada began to 
eliminate his opposition. He limited the power of the Assembly, 
and drove Chamorro into exile. Estrada then pursued a course 
which affected all aspects of Nicaraguan life through the 
twentieth century. 
To curtail War Minister Mena's (his chief rival) power, 
Estrada approached the United states with a plan to transform the 
•
•
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Army into an "'apolitical' force trained and organized by 
American military advisors. ,,20 Before these plans could be 
implemented, however, Mena's officers staged a coup, and forced 
Estrada to resign. Adolfo Diaz became president, and accepted 
the American proposal to implement Estrada's plan of reorganizing 
the army. The plan called for "the creation of 'a small 
disciplined regular armed force, American Army officers to be the 
instructors.'" This became the first u.s. attempt to reorganize 
the Nicaraguan Military.Z1 
In 1912, General Luis Mena, secretary of War under Diaz, 
launched an attack against Diaz. Following a plea by Diaz, the 
united states sent in Marines to Nicaragua for the purpose of 
thwarting thi~ Liberal revolt. Z2 For the next twenty-two years, 
u.s. Marines, remained in Nicaragua, essentially revoking 
Nicaragua's Independence. with the help of the Marines, Diaz 
defeated Mena and assumed the presidency. 
The presence of U.S. Marines in Nicaragua severely affected 
the Nicaraguan military. The assured security which American 
forces provided led to the decline in not only the army's number, 
but also in its ability. The Conservative regimes of this period 
depended upon American support for their survival, and the United 
States used this dependence to greatly strengthen its political 
and economic controls over the country.23 
The U.S. profited from its dominance in Nicaragua. The 
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1914, fulfilled a long time U.S. 
objective of securing canal rights in Nicaragua. In exchange for 
7 
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$3 million, the u.s. gained exclusive rights to build a canal 
through Nicaragua, as well as possession of the Corn Islands. 
The u.s. began to employ "legal" means of ensuring dominance. 24 
In 1917, with the united states' blessing, Emiliano Chamorro 
became president. During the same year, the Lansing Plan 
solidified Nicaraguan dependence upon the United states. The 
Lansing Plan bound Nicaragua economically, for it enabled the 
state Department to force loans upon Nicaragua which benefitted 
•
 
U. s. banking interests. 25 
In 1923, Conservative Carlos Solorzano, became president, 
while a Liberal, Juan Batista Sacasa assumed the Vice-Presidency. 
Sacasa's faction included a former automobile salesman, and 
toilet inspe~tor, Anastasio Somoza Garcia. While in the United 
States, Somoza proclaimed to have had a political conversion to 
liberalism, and thus returned to aid Sacasa. Somoza eventually 
became the most influential figure in Nicaraguan history.26 
The u.s. planned on withdrawing the Marines from Nicaragua 
in 1925, but President Solorzano asked the u.s. to suspend those 
plans, which the u.s. agreed to do. In return, Solorzano agreed 
to once again move forward with the plans to create a U.S. 
trained National Guard. In February 1925, the State Department 
gave Nicaragua the blueprint of the plan which called for 
replacing the entire armed forces of Nicaragua. Placed in charge 
of this Guard was ex-army officer, Major Calvin B. Carter. with 
Carter in place, the Marines left on August 4, 1925. 27 
Just three weeks after the Marines left, a serious crisis 
8 
•

•
 erupted as Chamorro once again made a bid to lead a revolution. 
At this time, the National Guard remained weak, and it appeared 
that Solorzano might be defeated. Chamorro demanded that he be 
appointed Minister of War, and with the National Guard unable to 
stop him, Solorzano conceded. 28 Although Solorzano remained 
President, the real control of Nicaragua, "was now in the hands 
of General Emil iano Chamorro. ,,29 
The departure of the Marines exposed a major problem. After 
American military dominance between 1912-1924, "there had been 
little change in Nicaragua. It still remained a country 
unprepared for democracy, with a penchant for revolution. ,,30 
The United States withdrew the Marines, and in their place left a 
very weak National Guard. 
The U.S. made it clear that any Chamorro-headed government 
would not be recognized. However, on January 16, 1926, because 
of "health" reasons, Solorzano resigned in favor of Chamorro. 31 
In May of the same year, the Liberals launched yet another 
attack, this time at the Eastern city of Bluefields, in which 
they seized the governor, and looted an American-managed National 
Bank. Chamorro responded by sending in the National Guard, which 
stopped the uprising. 32 
The revolution continued to spread across Nicaragua. 
Meanwhile, reports surfaced that Sacasa and the Liberals received 
arms and soldiers from Mexico, much to the chagrin of the united 
States. Nicaragua was once again in a state of flUX, and as a 
result the U.S. sent a new charge', Lawrence Denis to the scene. 
9 
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 Denis believed that "Nicaragua was in for a cycle of revolutions 
unless Chamorro agreed to a settlement acceptable to the 
Liberals. " The Marines returned to Nicaragua. 33 
Two sides eventually emerged in the revolution. The 
Liberals insisted that Juan Batista Sacasa be president, while 
the Conservatives, with u.s. support, favored Adolfo Diaz. The 
two sides met on the U.S.S. Denver where they reached only one 
agreement. As a result of this agreement, Chamorro resigned and 
u.s. backed Adolfo Diaz replaced him as president. The Liberals 
countered by setting up a "Constitutional Government" of their 
own, headed by Sacasa. The country began to move towards 
anarchy, and u.s. President Calvin Coolidge, and Secretary of 
State Frank Kellog decided on full scale U.S. intervention.~ 
When the Marines left in 1925, the Nicaraguan National Guard 
replaced them as peace keepers. The Guard proved too weak to 
handle the country's revolution. The United states did not want 
to send in the Marines again and looked for a viable alternative. 
President Coolidge decided on sending Henry L. stimson to mediate 
a peace settlement. 
THE STIMSON MISSION 
Henry L. Stimson, a Harvard Law School graduate, entered the 
pUblic life as District Attorney in New York. After an 
unsuccessful run at governor of New York, he eventually served as 
a Colonel in World War I. In 1926, Stimson worked briefly in 
South America mediating a dispute between Chile and Peru. 
•
•
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stimson now turned his attention to Nicaragua. 35 The New York 
Times reported that "the designation of Mr. stimson is generally 
interpreted as a 'super' representative in that country." 
Although having little knowledge of Nicaragua, stimson 
nonetheless embarked on his mission energetically. The state 
Department reported that the purpose of the mission was "to get 
information • • • as to the entire situation in that country for 
the use of this Government." In addition, stimson had to follow 
the policies of the U.S. which included the protection of 
Americans, and safeguarding the Canal route and naval base rights 
acquired by the United states through treaty. In the eyes of the 
United states, the Nicaraguan civil War directly threatened 
American interests. 36 
stimson arrived in mid-April, 1927. His task centered on 
determining who the rightful president according to the 
Nicaraguan constitution was. Besides this riddle, other aspects 
such as humanitarian concerns, as well as the fact that the 
planting season approached with important implications for 
people's diets, and the nation's economy, made ending it quickly 
an urgent matter. coolidge gave stimson full power. 37 
After conferring with both sides of the war, as well as the 
pUblic, stimson quickly obtained an overview of the situation. 
He found that "the military situation was one of deadlock. Both 
armies fought well on the defensive; neither possessed the 
disciplined organization for effective continuous offensive 
action." stimson realized that without U.s. assistance, the 
11 
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situation could never peacefully be resolved. To his surprise, 
however, both sides sought American assistance in ending the 
deadlock. 38 
Stimson favored a U.S. supervised election in 1928 to end 
the conflict. He saw certain conditions necessary however, to 
reach this end, and he now turned his attention to these pre­
requisites. First of all, peace and general amnesty had to be 
obtained. Second, in order to ensure this peace, a complete 
disarmament of both sides had to happen. Finally, the key to all 
of this according to stimson, lay with the creation of a new and 
impartial police force, "to take the place of the forces which 
the government was in the habit of using to terrorize and control 
elections. ,,39 This last condition shaped Nicaraguan history for 
the next fifty years. 
On April 22, Nicaraguan President Adolfo Diaz sent stimson 
an outline of proposed peace plans. The memorandum called for: 
Immediate peace, and delivery of arms to the Americans: general 
amnesty, and return of exiles, and confiscated land: 
Participation in Diaz's cabinet by representative Liberals: 
•
 
U.s. training of a Nicaraguan constabulary: U.s. supervision of 
the 1928, and SUbsequent elections: and temporary continuance of 
the U.S. Marines to enforce the plan. The plan also called for 
Diaz to remain president until the 1928 elections. stimson 
believed that "only through his remaining in office was an 
immediate peace settlement possible." Armed with Diaz's and thus 
the Conservatives peace plan, stimson sought the Liberals' 
•
•
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response. 40 
stimson did not believe that Sacasa and the Liberals would 
accept the peace plan. He therefore decided to take a hard-ball 
approach, notifying Sacasa that u.s. policy of supporting Diaz 
was non-negotiable, and the only hope for Sacasa was to agree on 
supervised elections in 1928. 41 Stimson knew that he had to 
include the Liberals in the peace plan, but he also had to remain 
stern, making them realize that they did not really have a 
choice. On April 30, Sacasa sent representatives to meet with 
stimson aboard the u.s. ship preston. 42 
Aboard the Preston, the Liberals agreed to several points. 
They agreed to U.S. supervised elections. They also recognized a 
u.s. zone of ~nfluence extending to Panama. Finally, they agreed 
not to make any treaties with Mexico. 43 However, as the New 
York Times reported, although the name of President Diaz had· not 
been brought up in peace discussions, the "continuance of 
President Diaz in office will be a stumbling block in the way of 
a successful outcome. ,,44 
Indeed, the meetings ended because the Liberals told stimson 
that they had progressed as far as they could without getting rid 
of Diaz. Ironically, the Liberals told stimson that Diaz 
represented the most acceptable Conservative to them. The 
problem centered on pride and principle. They fought him for 
months, and to support Diaz now was impossible. The 
representatives informed Stimson that further negotiations must 
take place with General Jose Maria Moncada's, Sacasa's Secretary 
•
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of War, and field commander, and besides Sacasa, the most 
important Liberal. 45 
On May 4, stimson met with General Moncada at Tipitapa, a 
small village on the river connecting Lake Managua with Lake 
Nicaragua to discuss peace plans. Moncada frankly admitted to 
stimson that "neither he nor any Nicaraguan could, without the 
help of the united states, end the war or pacify the country. 
,,46 Although this was the case, Moncada still refused to 
support Diaz. stimson, however, informed Moncada that "the 
retention of President Diaz during the remainder of his term is 
regarded as essential to that plan and will be insisted upon. ,,47 
Although he still did not support Diaz, Moncada agreed to 
recommend that the Liberals stop fighting. 48 Finally, on May 
12, 1927 stimson received a letter from Moncada, "signed by him 
and by all of his chieftains except General Augusto Ceasar 
Sandino formally agreeing to lay down their arms. • • " which 
49seemed to end the war The fact that Sandino refused to 
surrender seemed inconsequential at the time. 
stimson left Nicaragua on May 16, a jUbilant victor. The 
final truce which the state Department disclosed to the New York 
Times called for the American supervision of Nicaraguan affairs, 
including the organizing of a native police force. In addition 
the u.s. agreed to supervise the 1928 elections. 5o stimson 
reflected on his accomplishments by declaring that "The final 
announcement of a settlement met with general demonstrations of 
joy and satisfaction in Nicaragua. ,,51 stimson felt that he had 
14 
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done a noble thing. He succeeded in ending the civil war and 
attaining stability in Nicaragua. 
Not everyone approved of the plan. Ironically, at the 
beginning of his mission, a New York Times editorial said that a 
stimson settlement "would go far to silence criticism, and to 
refute the charge, so widely echoed in South America • that 
the sending of our Marines to Nicaragua was a sinister 
development of 'American Imperialism' ,,52 The stimson mission 
merely revoked much of Nicaragua's independence because the U.S. 
forced its will upon the country. In addition, the Mission 
marked a turning point in u.s. - Latin American relations, 
because it began the precedent of the United states training 
Latin Americ~n police forces. For Stimson, the mission also 
represented a turning point, as it led to him becoming Secretary 
of State. In the end, stimson's mission failed to even produce 
lasting peace, because although civil war had ended, guerilla 
warfare soon began. 
THE REBEL - AUGUSTO CEASAR SANDINO 
Following the departure of stimson, Augusto Ceasar Sandino 
launched a revolution that lasted for six years. Sandino's goal 
centered on the expulsion of the United states from Nicaragua. 
Sandino fled to the mountains to hide, and began his war. 
The six year conflict between Sandino and the National Guard 
commenced on July 16, 1927. 53 On this date Sandino attacked the 
Guard at the city of Ocotal. Although the Guard easily crushed 
Sandino and forced him back into the mountains, this conflict 
•
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marked a watershed for Sandino's forces. Sandino learned that he 
had to use ambushes and sudden raids to be effective. From this 
point on in the war, Sandino only attacked "when the odds were 
heavily in his favor - when he clearly had the advantaged of 
surprise, cover, and superior firepower. ,,54 In essence, this 
marked the beginning not only of guerilla war, but also of the 
Sandinistas. 
By the end of 1927, the ordeal of capturing Sandino began to 
embarrass the u.s. In China, an army unit had been named after 
him, and in Moscow he received praise. In the united states, 
(just as Che Guevera would be in the Sixties) Sandino became a 
hero of the Left. The Americans decided to launch a major strike 
against "El C~ipote," Sandino' s base in the mountains. 55 
Following wave after wave of U.S. air strikes, a united 
ground force consisting of the National Guard, and united states 
Marines set out for El Chipote. When the forces arrived, Sandino 
was long gone, reportedly fifty miles away.56 Just as in 
vietnam almost forty years later, the united states began to 
realize the difficulties in waging a war against guerrillas who 
enjoyed the popular support of local peasants. 
Following the Nicaraguan election of Jose Moncada in 1928, 
U.S. policy began to change. At this time the united states 
embarked on a plan to replace the Marines with the National Guard 
as quickly as possible. 57 The "Nicaraguaisation" of the war now 
began. 
Sandino, meanwhile, concocted a plan for a coup in 
16 
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Nicaragua. He wrote to other Latin American heads of state 
informing them of his plans. In addition, Sandino requested a 
loan from Mexico to which ends he went to that country to meet 
with its government. However, upon arrival in Mexico, he 
discovered that at the instruction of the united states, Mexico 
had double-crossed him. Sandino remained isolated in Mexico, not 
meeting with the President for months. When the two finally met, 
the Mexican government refused to help. The U.S. reported 
Sandino's exodus as a clear retreat, and temporarily succeeded in 
stalling his troops.~ 
By 1931, it became increasingly clear that the National 
Guard, even with u.s. support, faltered in its attempts to 
contain let a~one destroy sandino. 59 Coinciding with this, the 
United states Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, announced 
plans in 1931 to reduce the number of Marines from 1,500 men, to 
500 men. The policy of withdrawing the Marines accelerated in 
1932 when Franklin D. Roosevelt became president of the United 
States, and initiated his "Good Neighbor Policy," with a promise 
to refrain from intervention and interference in Latin 
America. 60 
On January 1, 1933, a Liberal President, Juan B. Sacasa 
became president of Nicaragua. In addition, Sacasa's nephew-in­
law, General Anastasio Somoza Garcia took over his new post as 
Jefe Director (commander) of the National Guard. The next day, 
the last U.s. Marines left the country. In six years 132 Marines 
died in action, a figure less than the total number of 
17 
Sandinistas killed in a single battle at ocotal. 61 
After the Marines left, on February 2, 1933, Sandino flew to 
Managua to meet with Sacasa. That same night, Sacasa and Sandino 
signed a peace settlement in which Sandino ended his war. In 
addition, Sandino agreed to gradually turn in his arms. In 
return, the Sandinistas received full amnesty, a tract of land to 
form an agricultural colony, permission to retain an army of 100 
men, and a promise that the Sandinistas would be given employment 
preference on all public works projects in the North. 62 The war 
officially ended. 
Not everyone liked the settlement. Somoza was furious that 
Sacasa had granted Sandino any concessions. Somoza believed that 
Sandino had s~ashed away the majority of his weapons for future 
use against the National Guard.~ Tensions between Sandino and 
Somoza increased when Sandino (who had now retired to his 
agricultural colony) began proclaiming that the National Guard 
was unconstitutional, and refused to surrender his weapons. As 
the end of Sacasa's term approached, a power struggle emerged 
between Sandino and Somoza.M 
Somoza then launched a plan to arrest and kill Sandino. He 
informed his conspirators that they had full support from the 
U.S. 65 On February 21, 1934, as he left President Sacasa's 
•
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house after a dinner, Guardsmen kidnapped sandino, his father, 
and two of his aides. The Guardsmen took Sandino to an airfield, 
and shot him to death.~ 
The assassination of Sandino helped solidify Somoza's 
•
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control over the National Guard, ultimately leading to his 
control of the country. First, he not only eliminated a possible 
political rival, but also gained support from the Guard, which 
hated Sandino. In addition, Somoza openly encouraged the 
Guardsmen to take part in widespread corruption. This action 
further isolated the Guard from the citizens of Nicaragua, making 
them as dependent on Somoza as he was on them. 67 
THE RISE TO POWER OF ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCIA 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia was the son of a well-to-do coffee 
grower. Known as "Tacho," Somoza had been educated in the United 
states, where he met and married Salvadora Debayle (Juan Sacasa's 
niece). He r~turned to Nicaragua in 1926, to help the Liberals 
in the civil war.~ Following the assassination of sandino, 
Somoza consolidated and tightened his grip over the National' 
Guard, and began his ascent to power. 
By the end of 1934, Somoza finally admitted that he had 
ordered the assassination of Sandino, something strongly believed 
anyway. Somoza also announced that he intended to run for 
president in 1936. Somoza was never prosecuted for his first 
admission, and his desire to become president remained in danger 
because the Nicaraguan Constitution banned him on two counts; as 
a relative to the current president and as Jefe Director of the 
National Guard, a supposedly a-political force.~ Somoza 
assured Arthur Bliss Lane, the U.s. Minister in Nicaragua, 
however, that he "would take no violent action whatever against 
•
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President Sacasa.. ,,70 Lane, however, was very skeptical 
because Somoza also promised not kill Sandino. 
By May of 1935, Somoza began campaigning for President even 
though the Nicaraguan Constitution forbade any such activity 
until six months prior to a Presidential election. Sacasa began 
placing responsibility on the united states because they had 
created the National Guard, and now Somoza was using its power to 
disobey the Constitution. Minister Lane believed that the u.s. 
might possibly consider some course of action noting "I am 
prepared to admit that the United states' prestige may suffer in 
Latin America temporarily should Somoza become president. 1171 
Somoza began to take advantage of the united states' policy of 
non-intervention. 
Somoza had to deal with the Constitutional barriers 
preventing him from becoming President. He maintained control of 
the Guard and possessed the militarily ability to take over, but 
he would not be seen as the legitimate president. Somoza planned 
to have a constituent assembly called to elect him provisional 
president. Sacasa informed the U.s. that this was 
unconstitutional and hoped the united states would not recognize 
Somoza in such a scenario. Lane replied by simply stating that 
the U.s. did not consider options which had not yet happened. n 
By August of 1935, Somoza made it clear that he definitely 
intended on being the next president, and told Lane that "there 
was nobody in Nicaragua who could prevent it."73 Lane informed 
Cordell Hull, now the U.s. Secretary of State, that if any 
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obstacle impeded Somoza, "he could not, in my opinion, be 
depended upon to keep his word, many times given to me, that he 
would not use violence."~ Somoza realized that attempts to 
legitimize his campaign stalled, so he determined to simply take 
the presidency. 
By late september, the situation in Nicaragua began to reach 
a crisis level. Lane discovered that members of the National 
Guard planned to demand Sacasa's resignation, but at the last 
minute, Somoza stopped the Guardsmen.~ On the other side, the 
Executive committee of the Liberal Party, along with several 
Nicaraguan municipalities, demanded that Sacasa order Somoza to 
resign.~ Sacasa knew that Somoza aspired to take his job, but 
he also knew that the forced resignation of Somoza would lead to 
a civil war. Once again he pleaded for U.S. assistance, citing 
the fact that the Americans had created the Guard. Lane informed 
him of the U.s.' refusal to intervene in the crisis. n 
By February of 1936, a gas crisis engulfed Nicaragua. A mob 
consisting of chauffeurs and other workers had taken to the 
streets. 78 Sacasa believed that the Guard had instigated the 
movement by the chauffeurs for political reasons. This indeed may 
be true as many members of the mob called for Somoza to take over 
as President of Nicaragua.~ 
I
I
I
 
I
•
•
 
The gas crisis demonstrated how powerless Sacasa was. 
Somoza controlled the only force in Nicaragua with the capability 
to quell the riot, and thus Sacasa remained at his mercy. As a 
result, in May of 1936, Sacasa sent a personal letter to 
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Washington explaining his situation, and blaming the United 
I 
I states. Sacasa wrote that since Somoza took control of the 
National Guard, "he has been usurping the functions which belong 
I 
to me, as Commander in Chief of the Army, disregarding orders 
emanating from my authority. 1180 He went on to say that he had 
no military support to defend his legitimately elected government 
I and without assistance from the united states, "blood will 
probably be shed, anarchy will reign • • • and latent communism • 
• • will find a favorable field in which to develop. • • • ,,81 
Once again the u.s. cited its policy of non-intervention, and 
non-interference in the region and refused assistance. By the 
end of May, the revolution was in full swing, and Somoza's forces 
had possession of the electric light plant, and all strategic 
buildings in Leon. 82 
By the end of May 1936, somoza's men controlled virtually 
all of Managua and Leon. Thus on June 9, 1936, Sacasa and Vice 
President Espinosa resigned their posts.M Somoza in a move to 
"legitimize" his power, called for December elections, Which he 
easily won. M The Somoza dynasty was born. 
Historian Richard Millett writes that, "The major share of 
the responsibility for Somoza's seizure of power • must rest 
with the United states. ,,85 The United states left Nicaragua 
with the National Guard to police the country. When Somoza began 
to use this institution to gain power, the U.s. did nothing to 
stop him. Without the U.S., Sacasa remained helpless to defend 
his regime, and Somoza took over. 
22 
I
 
I
 
A DYNASTY TAKES OVER - FROM SOMOZA I TO SOMOZA III 
I Anastasio Somoza Garcia ruled from 1936-1956. He 
implemented a formula to maintain control, which comprised ofI
 
I 
three objectives: maintaining support of the National Guard, co­
opting important domestic power contenders, and cultivating the 
Americans. u This last ingredient meant basically doing 
I everything the U.S. asked, to the point where "The Ambassador 
ranked as the second most powerful man in the country, and, at 
times, as the most powerful. ,,87 On the night of September 20, 
1956 a young poet, Rigoberto Lopez, shot Somoza four times. U.S. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower flew in several American 
physicians, but Somoza still died.~ 
The assa~sination did not kill the dynasty. With the death 
of his father, Luis Somoza automatically seized the presidency, 
while his brother Anastasio Somoza Garcia II used the National 
Guard to assure that any political opponents stayed out of the 
way.~ Luis promoted such programs as pUblic housing and 
education, social security, and agrarian reforms.~ The U.S. 
under John F. Kennedy and his Alliance for Progress sent more aid 
to Nicaragua. The Alliance, however, ended up hurting Nicaraguan 
citizens, because the government put the money into projects 
which benefitted the oligarchy. Cotton fields replaced grain 
fields, and the Nicaraguans began to "lose their capacity to feed 
themselves. ,,91 The situation grew worse, and by 1967 a new 
guerilla organization, the National Sandinista Liberation Front 
(FSLN or Sandinistas) began operations in revolt against the 
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government. In 1961, the group had adopted the name of the 
country's most famous nationalist hero, and their actions 
eventually led to the collapse of the Somoza dynasty in 1979. 92 
Following his brother's death in 1967, Anastasio Somoza 
Garcia II became the third, and last Somoza to rule Nicaragua. 
He differed from his brother in that he relied heavily on 
military power to protect his rule. In addition, he replaced the 
skilled technicians, (which Luis placed in charge of the economy) 
with his friends who lacked economic skills.~ 
The election of Richard Nixon to the White House, pleased 
Somoza. Nixon and Somoza both saw the Communist threat in the 
hemisphere the same way, and neither wanted to see it spread. 
Nixon undertook a visit to Latin America in 1958, in which the 
then Vice-President encountered hostile demonstrations protesting 
his visit. Nicaragua did not greet him with such hostility, -and 
so he "considered Somoza a firm American ally, deserving of all 
possible support. ,,94 Nixon named Turner Shelton as Ambassador 
to Nicaragua, and he and Somoza soon became friends. 95 From 
Nixon, the Somoza dynasty enjoyed a relationship in which 
Washington granted its fullest support and favor. In April of 
1971, the Nixons entertained Somoza at a private dinner, while in 
1972 Somoza contributed one-mill ion-dollars to the Nixon 
campaign.% In his autobiography, Somoza related of Nixon that 
"I consider myself his friend. ,,97 
While he enjoyed a "good time" abroad, internally Somoza's 
support deteriorated. In 1971 Somoza's term came to an end. Of 
•
•
•
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course he wanted to stay in power, so he reached a political 
agreement with his former rival, Fernando Aguerro. Under this 
agreement, a three-man-junta of Aguerro, and two Somoza 
representatives assumed power. 106 In theory, Somoza no longer 
held power, but the appearances deceived no one. 
This plan suffered attack from two sources. The church 
issued a statement indicating that it wanted to see a whole new 
system, and that this new government merely reenforced Somoza's 
hold on the country. 107 The second attack came from Pedro 
Joaquin Chamorro. Chamorro, through his newspaper LaPrensa, (the 
leading opposition newspaper of Somoza in Nicaragua) insisted 
that Somoza would still rule through the use of the National 
Guard. Furthermore, Chamorro believed that Somoza simply planned 
on running again for President in 1974.1~ 
DEVASTATION AND CORRUPTION - THE 1972 EARTHQUAKE 
On December 23, 1972, disaster strUCk. The city of Managua 
shook, the result of a devastating earthquake which ravaged the 
city. within minutes, the city lay in shambles. The official 
death toll reached ten-thousand people. An additional twenty 
thousand suffered injuries, and three-hundred-thousand people of 
Managua found themselves homeless. 109 Reflecting on the 
situation Somoza declared the situation "the worst moment in the 
history of Nicaragua ,,110 
Immediately following the earthquake, the U.S. pledged full 
support. Nixon phoned Somoza, and informed him that the U.S. 
I
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I 
planned to put forth an all-out effort to aid Nicaragua. Medical 
I supplies, bulldozers, and other items arrived at a tonnage 
rate. Somoza, of course, thanked the u.s. declaring that
'" 
I 
Nicaragua would "always be grateful for the aid which came from 
so many countries, and particularly the United states of 
I 
I 
America. ,,112 
I In the days following the earthquake, chaos and corruption 
ran rampant. The National Guard, who had the duty of maintaining 
stability, left in search of their families. On their way, the 
guardsmen proceeded to loot automobile dealerships, and appliance 
shops while ignoring pleas for help. 113 Somoza later claimed 
• 
I that only some looting took place by a few officers, but this was 
by no means the norm (emphasis added). 114 .The people of 
Nicaragua saw things differently. In addition, the food sent by 
the United states remained at the airport away from the hungry~ and homeless. Not until four days after the earthquake did food 
begin to be distributed. 115
• 
I 
While Managua suffered from the earthquake, Somoza profited
I handsomely. The United states sent thirty-two-million dollars in 
government funds, plus over one-hundred-thousand dollars from 
private sources. Of this, the Nicaraguan Treasury accounted for 
I only sixteen-million-dollars. '16 No one doubts where the rest 
I 
of the money went. In 1974 one estimate placed Somoza's worth at 
I $400 million. '17 Somoza argued that some people "claimed that 
international relief was exploited for my own personal gain. 
Nothing could be further from the truth." 118 
I 
• 
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Somoza also profited from other aspects of the rebuilding
I process. He and his cronies decided where all of the new housing 
and buildings were built. He invested in demolition, earth 
I 
moving, heavy equipment, construction materials, real estate, and 
housing. Somoza had a hand in every aspect of the rebuilding 
I 
I 
process, and "His greed and his willingness to take advantage of 
I his compatriots' suffering seemed boundless.,,119 
Somoza's actions during the crisis alienated the citizens of 
Nicaragua. Because he virtually ignored the business class, they 
became enraged at Somoza to the point where the "'social 
II 
contract' between the Somozas and the independent businessmen had 
I been broken.,,120 The press highlighted the rage. One report 
positioned me~ers of Somoza's relief team, hungry, thirsty, andI tired around his pool while he ate a three-course-meal, offering 
them nothing, not even a glass of water. 121 
During the crisis, Somoza once again assumed power. In 
I 1974, an election occurred, and of course Somoza won by a 
landslide. This election did not go without protest, as Pedro 
I	 Joaquin Chamorro, and twenty-six other Opposition leaders signed 
a petition declaring that both Somoza, and his opponent (who 
Somoza hand picked to oppose him) should be disqualified on 
-
constitutional grounds. This motion failed to move the Electoral
- Tribune which rejected it. 122 On August 31, 1974, the day 
II 
I before the election, in a sadly humorous move, LaPrensa ran a 
headline titled: "Candidates who won tomorrow's election.,,123 
Upon election, Somoza revised the Constitution, ensuring his rule 
II 
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until 1981. 
On December 27, 1974, the Sandinistas struck back. They 
raided a dinner party and kidnapped several individuals of the 
government. The group demanded one-million-dollars in ransom, 
the release of Sandinista prisoners, a pUblic broadcast and 
pUblishing of a message from the F.S.L.N. to the people of 
Nicaragua, and a plane to take them to Cuba. Somoza complied 
with all of these demands. 124 Somoza had underestimated the 
strength of the F.S.L.N., and in a fit of rage, declared a state 
of siege. This raid by the Sandinistas led Somoza to employ sick 
violations of human rights, (which will be discussed later) in 
which the National Guard sought to destroy the F.S.L.N. By 1976, 
Nicaragua displayed an increasingly "impoverished, divided, 
corrupt. repressed, and angry society. ,,125 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLICY WRONGS -- THE CARTER 
ADMINISTRATION TAKES OVER 
When Carter took office in 1977, he placed human rights at 
the center of his foreign policy. Raised in the South, Carter 
saw firsthand the travesty of racism. He drew on this experience 
in placing human rights on his agenda, declaring that the United 
states "has been strongest and most effective when morality and a 
commitment to freedom and democracy have been most clearly 
emphasized in our foreign policy. ,,126 Carter saw human rights 
as the most effective way to deal with totalitarian ideologies. 
He criticized past Administrations under which "military 
dictators were immune from any criticism of their oppressive 
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actions. ,,127 
I In a speech aimed at oppressive dictators, Carter ordered to 
"'Give your people freedom to worship, to express themselves, to 
shape their own destiny, to vote, to live in peace, and to live 
in freedom.' ,,128 Speaking on behalf of Carter, Deputy Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher promised concentrated attention to 
the "violations of integrity • • • officially sanctioned murders, 
tortures, and detentions without trial. ,,129 Carter wanted a 
tough human rights policy. 
Somoza exhibited all of the ugly traits which Carter pledged 
to work against. In June of 1976, hearings took place before the 
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on International 
Organizations~ The issue at hand -- human rights abuses. 
Nicaragua failed miserably. An exiled Nicaraguan historian, 
Edelberto Torres, reported several abuses by Somoza. These, 
included: rapes of women, castrations of men, application of 
electric prods, karate chops to the stomach, and when the victim 
"vomits blood they force him to clean the floor with his tongue," 
mechanical extraction of the nails one by one, and finally, being 
thrown from a helicopter. 130 The House Report also included 
testimony that political prisoners experienced "innovative" 
tortures, such as electric shocks, fractured eardrums, pulled 
teeth, being hung from the testicles, having acid poured on them, 
and being forced to stand for nine days. 131 These tortures 
awaited political prisoners, and by 1976, the Somoza regime 
desperately needed reform. 
•
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During the Carter Years (1977-1980) Nicaragua did not 
I represent the only event in foreign policy. In fact several 
other situations took precedent in foreign policy. Carter and 
the Soviets held negotiations to consider the second strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), deemed crucial for arms 
reduction in the Cold War. In addition the United states talked 
I with the People's Republic of China in order to restore formal 
diplomatic relations with that country, and to break ties with 
I 
I Nationalist China. Carter also conducted the Middle East Peace 
Talks between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David, which provided the 
I framework for "peace" in the Middle East. In Africa, the Cubans 
became involved in the Horn of Africa, and conflicts in Southern 
I Rhodesia escalated. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the 
Iranian conflict erupted into a revolution. Most important toI 
I 
Carter personally, the United states conducted talks with Panama 
in order to transfer the rights of the canal to that country. In 
short, the Presidency of Jimmy Carter witnessed several crucial 
I events in terms of foreign policy. 
The Carter Administration had little time for Nicaragua atI 
I 
the beginning of its term. The early U.s. approach to Nicaragua 
consisted of general policies, formulated for foreign policy in 
general, and then applied to Nicaragua for specific 
I circumstances. 132 concerning Latin American Policy, three of 
Carter's themes affected Nicaragua. First, Carter's commitmentI to new canal treaties with Panama meant making concerns of small 
I 
I
I 
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Central American countries u.s. concerns. Carter did not want 
the region to erupt, thus jeopardizing the treaties. Second, 
Carter adamantly opposed overthrowing, or for that matter 
interfering at all, with any established government. Finally, a 
third theme provided for the protection of human rights. 1n 
These last two themes, non-interference, and human rights, 
eventually clashed, as the Somoza regime grew increasingly 
brutal. Obvious contradictions exist in forcing a regime to 
abide by human rights, while not interfering in the country. For 
Carter, however, the beginning of his term saw a relatively 
stable Nicaragua, and thus this conflict did not yet show. On 
January 10, 1978, Carter and the u.S. saw the Nicaraguan 
situation explode. 
THE CHAMORRO ASSASSINATION - NICARAGUA TAKES CENTER 
STAGE 
Lake points out that the assassination of Chamorro demanded 
the attention of the seventh floor of the State Department, or 
rather, "the Seventh Floor, for this is where the power 
resides. ,,134 While some people claim that Somoza knew nothing 
about the assassination, evidence that he indeed knew exists. 
Just as his father did after the assassination of sandino, Somoza 
claimed no knowledge of the plot, and he even produced 
"suspects." 
The rivalry between the Chamorros and the Somozas dated back 
to the late nineteenth century. As mentioned earlier, Pedro 
Joaquin's grandfather defeated Somoza's great uncle for the 
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rights of Presidency. In 1926, Chamorro's father founded 
I	 LaPrensa, for the express reason of publishing opposition against 
the elder Somoza.I 
I 
Pedro Joaquin, and Anastasio Somoza II, knew each other from 
grammar school. The two engaged in many fights stemming from 
Pedro Joaquin's criticism of Somoza's father, but Somoza claims 
I	 that "Chamorro never bested me. Psychologically, I think, the 
results .•• stayed with him all of his life.,,13s Whether orI 
I 
not Somoza never lost remains to be seen. The conflict 
nevertheless continued into adulthood. 
I 
Chamorro continued the opposition that his father started, 
I and often found himself in trouble with the government. In 1954, 
the elder Somoza jailed Chamorro for rebelling against theI government. Chamorro found himself banished from Managua for 
forty months in 1956 for publishing photos of the assassination 
of the elder Somoza. Chamorro led a rebellion in 1959 against 
I the National Guard which resulted once again in his jailing. 136 
Ouring the earthquake crisis, LaPrensa exposed the corruption of 
I the Somoza regime, and in 1977 the paper's sympathetic coverage 
of the Sandinistas led to censorship, and a ban on Chamorro 
leaving the country. Although he found many enemies within the 
­
I government, chamorro seemed too prominent to kill. 
Somoza hated Chamorro. By 1977, Chamorro resembled "an 
I 
I encyclopedia of Somoza's sins. ,,137 Somoza complained that
 
Chamorro misrepresented facts and distorted truths to suit his
 
fancy, and furthermore that he printed lies. 138 Norman Wolfson
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I
 
who Somoza employed for pUblic relations, notes that "Somoza 
I 
I didn't like Chamorro. Anyone who was called names and insulted • 
. • everyday of the week and still liked the man would be a 
freak. ,,139 
I Everyone demanded that Chamorro's killers be brought to
 
justice. Somoza claims his initial reaction centered on the
 
I
 
I question: "Who could have committed this murder? I knew one
 
thing for certain: No one connected with me or my administration
 
I
 
had been involved. ,,140 Everyone, of course suspected Somoza,
 
but he was shocked that people's "first inclination was that,
 
through some means, I was involved in the death of Chamorro. ,,141 
I Only one day after the murder, Somoza announced the arrests 
I of four suspects. Luis Pallais, a cousin of Somoza, informed him that a reporter knew the identity of the assassin. The reporter 
I
,
 
told Pallais that a man, Silvio Pena, approached him with the 
news that he planned on killing Chamorro. 142 
I Several problems with this story implicate rather than 
vindicate Somoza. First of all, the reporter whom Pena told this 
-
i 
story worked for Novedades, the Somoza owned newspaper. Why 
I
 would Somoza not have been told of this plan to kill Chamorro?
 
Somoza claims that he always worried "about his [Chamorro's] 
safety that I recall thinking this man should have security 
protection. ,,143 Either Somoza knew about the assassination, or 
he possessed incredible investigational skills. The latter 
assumption proves suspect when Wolfson recalls that he was "not 
impressed that within hours after the ••• murder, suspects were 
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arrested and [had] confessed.,,144 Chamorro's widow, Violetta, 
I 
I told the New York Times, that "The Government claims that the 
case has been solved, but I hold Somoza responsible because no 
one does anything without permission from above. ,,145 
I According to Somoza, Chamorro's exposes of a blood bank 
operated by Pena led to his death. Laprensa reported that the 
I 
I Plasmaferisis blood bank bought the blood of impoverished 
Nicaraguans for $5.25 a pint, and sold it abroad for enormous 
I 
profits. 146 Somoza states that "In reality what killed Chamorro 
was his extreme attack on Dr. Ramos [owner of Plasmaferisis]. 
,,147 Once again, however, Somoza implicates himself. In a 
I 1977 interview, Chamorro told the New York Times, that Somoza 
"definitely ha;s interests in that company" [Plasmaferisis]. 148 
I 
I Any possible documentation of this claim went up in smoke when 
the building burned down. The Government blamed the fire on 
"communist gangs," but witnesses said that it appeared to start 
I inside the building, and not as a result of protestors' fire 
I 
bombs. 149 
I Somoza made the suspects testify on television and on radio 
to distance them from the government. Interestingly, Pena's 
attorney and brother , Renaldo Pena Rivas, claimed that the 
I confessions resulted from torture. He also maintained that a 
witness who could prove Pena's innocence, had been silenced by 
I 
I death threats. 150 
In his memoirs, Robert Pastor side-steps the assassination 
of Chamorro. He does not express his opinion explicitly. Too 
I­
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much evidence against Somoza exists, however, to eradicate him 
I completely from knowledge of the assassination. The 
assassination led to a nationwide strike in Nicaragua, a virtual 
civil war, and finally, the resignation of Somoza. Chamorro's 
I assassination also caused a watershed for American foreign 
policy. Carter was forced to the examine the problems of 
I Nicaragua personally. 
I POLICY CLASHES - HOMAN RIGHTS VS. THE COLD WAR 
I Prior to Chamorro's death, contradictions in Carter's 
Foreign Policy began to show. As mentioned earlier, hearings 
I held in 1976 on human rights abuses demonstrated the atrocities 
committed by Somoza and the National Guard. The conclusion ofI the hearings clarified that "a change in u.s. policy toward that 
. 
I regime [Somoza] is crucial to the success of democratic forces in 
Nicaragua. ,,151 In early 1978, that change did not occur. 
~ 
­
Following the 1976 hearings, the human rights organization 
Amnesty International, blasted Nicaraguan abuses in August of 
1976. The report cited extensive torture, executions, political 
imprisonment, and other violations of the National Guard, 
including the disappearance of over 300 peasants. One assumes 
-
that this report, coupled with the 1976 hearings, might result in 
strict regulations toward Nicaragua. The opposite happened. In 
September, the State Department agreed to a $2.5 million arms 
credit agreement, and approved of $15.1 million in economic aid 
for 1978, The Nicaraguan opposition quickly pointed out that 
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I 
Somoza in the past decade received twenty-million-dollars in 
I military aid - the highest per capita allotment in the area. 152 
These figures together with the fact that the U.S. still trained 
I
 
the Nicaraguan National Guard, which committed these abuses,
 
showed the hypocrisy of Carter's policy.
 
By January of 1978, disagreement among Carter's policy 
I	 makers eventually led to even more inconsistencies. The state 
Department consists of several divisions of bureaus. Under 
Carter, the director of the Latin American bureau's Office of 
Central American Affairs was Wade Matthews, while Patricia Derian 
headed the human rights bureau. These two bureaus constantly 
argued over policy towards Nicaragua. The human rights bureau 
tried to make;policy on a country by country basis, while the 
Latin American bureau looked more at the full range of relations 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
The battle lines divided into two parties: career and non­
career officers. To the career officers, those in the human 
rights bureau saw problems through the idealistic lens of human 
rights. Career officers wanted a more realistic approach, based 
on an increase in intervention. The human rights bureau charged 
that promotion drove the career officers, and pursuing human 
rights involved friction, angry voices, and interference with 
routine aid packages which could jeopardize political careers. 
The system also inherently demanded that all those involved with 
a certain topic be allowed to see any document, and offer any 
objections where their interests conflict. 153 
I
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Adding to the gridlock, two agencies exist in policy making,
I the state Department and the National security council (NSC). 
The NSC advises the President on national security matters. In 
addition the NSC must coordinate policy, do long-term planning, 
I and ensure the implementation of the President's policies. Under 
Carter, zbigniew Brzezinski held the position of National 
I	 Security Advisor. Robert Pastor served under him. The Secretary 
of State, Cyrus Vance, also employed help, and this task went to 
I 
I Under Secretary Warren Christopher. As if the system did not 
inherently cause enough competition, the personalities of Vance 
and Brzezinski conflicted. Brzezinski differed from Vance in 
that he saw every event in terms of its implications in the Cold 
War. This difzerence eventually resulted in numerous policy 
mishaps. 
Following Chamorro's death, Nicaragua experienced a mass 
strike, as the business class for the first time rose up against 
Somoza. Midway through the strike, the Sandinistas launched 
another offensive, and although their effort failed to overthrow 
Somoza, they nonetheless demonstrated that Somoza's hold wavered. 
Somoza once again responded by sending out the National Guard. 
Following Pedro Joaquin's funeral, the citizens began marching in 
the street, and eventually clashes broke out with the National~ Guard. The guard responded by firing machine guns into theI	 crowd. A report by a Nicaraguan priest, Miguel D'Escoto, told 
I
, 
the State Department that the National Guard continued to carry 
out "widespread murder, torture, and rape ••• " and that 
I 
II 
. , 
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"peaceful women demonstrators in Managua were beaten with metal 
chains.. ,,154 
Once again proof existed of the atrocities of the Somoza 
regime, and once again Washington responded in a contradictory 
manner. On May 16, 1978 the washington Post ran a story 
headlined: "U.S. Alters Stand On Rights, Frees Aid to 
Nicaragua." John Goshgo, the Post's Correspondent in Nicaragua, 
reported that the Carter administration cleared for release 
twelve-million-dollars, which "had been held up for human rights 
reasons." Even though reports of atrocities continued to come in 
about Nicaragua, the administration nevertheless released twelve­
million more dollars to a regime it continually chastised for 
human rights abuses. Augmenting this aid, evidence surfaced that 
two weeks prior to this release the State Department secretly 
released $160,000 in military credits to cover equipment needed 
by the National Guard for a mil i tary hospital. 155 The 
administration preached one policy, but followed another. 
The May aid release indicated the real motives behind 
Carter's Foreign Policy. One of the reasons this aid passed, 
involved other aid to other countries. Congressman Charles 
Wilson (D-Tex), a pro-Somoza voice in congress, indicated that if 
the Nicaraguan aid did not go through, he planned on using his 
influence to sponsor legislation cutting off aid to at least six 
other countries, inclUding Panama, and most of Africa. Senior 
officials decided that the Somoza issue "had to take a clear 
second place to preventing serious damage to our world wide aid I 
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program ... 156 To the administration, Nicaragua did not 
constitute enough of a problem to sacrifice other interests. 
During this same time, Somoza increased u.s. fears about 
communism. In his book Somoza states that he continually told the 
"state Department . • • the President, the Congress and the 
American people . . . that the Sandinista movement was 
communist ... 157 He also tried to portray the entire Chamorro 
family as communist, and thus their association with the 
Sandinistas proved his allegations. 158 The Sandinistas launched 
an offensive in October of 1977, and then again in January of 
1978, leading many "Cold Warriors" to believe that a Somoza 
overthrow would lead to a communist replacement. It must be 
remembered tha~ Carter's National Security Advisor, Brzezinski, 
saw events in terms of how they affected u.S. - Soviet relations, 
and this affected policy decisions. The May release demonstrated 
the inconsistencies of human rights and the Carter 
administration's actual policies, but more damage occurred one 
month later. 
SENDING THE WRONG SIGNALS - THE CARTER LETTER 
At the end of June, 1978, Brzezinski sent Pastor a 
memorandum informing him that Carter wanted to send a letter to 
Somoza, encouraging him for improvements in human rights. During 
a June 19 press conference, Somoza pledged to improve human 
rights. He promised to allow the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission come to investigate Nicaragua. In addition, he 
I­
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pledged to allow back into the country the Group of Twelve (a
I group of businessmen exiled for their opposition to Somoza). 
Somoza also promised to consider Carter's proposal of granting 
amnesty for political prisoners (Somoza never did any of 
this) . 159 carter read these promises and wanted to encourageI,. 
K Somoza to follow up on them. Carter informed Brzezinski of his 
wishes to send a letter, and Brzezinski gave the duty of drafting~ 
the letter to Pastor. 
Pastor did not like the idea of sending a letter to Somoza. 
When Pastor protested to Brzezinski, he cut him off, telling him 
to "'write it. Put your concerns in the memo and clear it with 
State.,,,160 Pastor recommended against sending the letter for 
two reasons. He cited the fact that Somoza did not have a good 
record of keeping promises, and second, he feared that Somoza 
would use the letter for his own advantage. Brzezinski ignored 
these warnings. Lake claims, he "did not want to oppose the 
state Department on what he saw as a relatively minor matter when 
he was fighting it on • . . policy in the Horn of Africa, ,,161 
A reference to Cuba's presence in Ethiopia. 
Mark Schneider of the Human Rights bureau in the state 
Department also opposed sending a letter to Somoza. When he 
found out about the letter, Schneider "went through the 
roof ." 162 Schneider believed that Somoza would publicize the 
letter in order to improve his personal standing around the 
world. Both the Latin American, and Human Rights bureaus in the 
State Department, along with Pastor, the chief NSC expert in the 
_ _ 
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region, objected to sending the letter, but Brzezinski deleted 
I all warnings to carter. President Carter did not know that the 
l two bureaus in the state Department with the most knowledge on Nicaragua, and a NSC policy expert, opposed the idea of sending 
I the letter. Brzezinski served his own interests at the expense 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I, 
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of Carter's. 
This did not end the opposition. Pastor later wrote another 
memorandum to Brzezinski about the dangers of sending this 
letter. He warned that Somoza's promises about human rights 
should not be translated into real actions. He also added that 
because of the united states's historical relationship with 
Somoza, any act that even appeared to support him, could 
antagonize the opposition in Nicaragua.1~ Once again 
Brzezinski ignored his memorandum. 
In early July, the National Guard shot and killed twenty-six 
students on a hunger strike to protest the holding of political 
prisoners. Despite the enormity of the recent violation, on July 
21, the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Mauricio Solaun, still 
delivered the letter to Somoza praising him for his human rights 
pledges. In the letter, Carter told Somoza that "The steps 
toward respecting human rights that you are considering are 
important and heartening signs.. "Carter ended the letter 
by expressing his appreciation of Somoza's promises for 
"constructive actions. ,,164 
Just as the opponents of the letter had warned, Somoza tried 
to use the letter for his own personal benefit. In hisI 
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autobiography, Somoza proclaims: "I was not interested in a 
collector's item and, without being able to use the letter 
publ 1.C' 1y, that' s what 1.'twas. ,,165 Somoza proceeded to arrange a 
meeting with his critic, Venezuelan President Carlos Andrez 
Perez, and revealed to him the contents of the letter. This 
proved to be a crucial blunder and caused great embarrassment for 
Carter who considered Perez as one of his best personal friends. 
In February, Carter had pledged to work closely with Perez on the 
issue of human rights in Nicaragua. Now Perez found out from 
Somoza, the greatest abuser of human rights in Latin America, 
that Carter had sent him a letter encouraging him for human 
rights. Carter did not receive the warnings from his aides 
because Brzezinski deleted them from all of the memorandums. 
This did not bode well for Perez's trust of Carter.1~ 
Carter's problem did not end with Perez. A state Department 
Official leaked the contents of the letter to the press. On 
August 1, the Post reported that "Carter Letter to Somoza Stirs 
Human-Rights Row." More than ever the rift in the state 
Department turned into pUblic knowledge. The article reported 
that the letter caused deep concern within the State Department, 
because Carter sent it at a time when reported increases in 
abuses of human rights, further implicated Somoza. The article 
went on to quote unnamed officials who regarded "the timing of 
Carter's letter as a case of sending Somoza the wrong signal at 
the wrong time. ,,167 In addition to the Washington Post, the New 
York Times also covered the story, with the headline, "Carter 
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Said To Overrule Aides to Praise Somoza."1~ 
I 
I The leak to the press further embarrassed Carter. People 
saw his administration embroiled in contradiction, while his 
foreign policy seemed misguided. Human rights activists quickly 
I pointed out the contradictions of the administration towards 
Nicaragua. Not only did the letter cause several rifts for 
Carter, but more importantly for the future, it angered the~ Sandinistas who still despised the u.S. for its intervention at 
the turn of the century. 
Why was the letter allowed to be sent? By August of 1978, 
Somoza made it clear that he refused to step down from power 
until 1981, the next scheduled election. This determination 
coupled with the increased strength of the Sandinistas, led many 
in the administration (particularly Brzezinski) to believe that 
Somoza represented the only acceptable alternative to 
Sandinistas. 
A DYNASTY ENDS - THE SANDXNXSTAS AND THE FALL OF SOMOZA 
In October of 1978, the Organization of American states 
(OAS) under the supervision of the United States, organized a 
mediation effort between representatives from the Sandinistas, 
Somoza, and the OAS. The Sandinista representatives called for 
Somoza's immediate resignation. Somoza, through his 
representatives, demanded that he be allowed to finish his term, 
while the OAS proposed that Somoza resign, and hand power over to 
a junta that would include-members from Somoza's party and the 
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National Guard.1~ The Sandinistas rejected this mediation, and 
Somoza's refusal to resign led to the collapse of the talks in 
January of 1979. 
The u.s. obviously controlled the OAS proposals. The Carter 
administration created this proposal which totally excluded the 
Sandinistas from any possible interim government. More 
frightening, however, the Carter administration proposed to leave 
the National Guard intact, the same guard who time after time, 
carried out some of the most gross violations of human rights in 
history. For the Carter administration, the threat of communism 
began to supersede human rights considerations. 
Unfortunately, Nicaraguan citizens continued to suffer. In 
November of 19;78, an OAS group reported that the National Guard 
continued indiscriminate bombing of civilians, summary and mass 
executions, as well as other tortures. A women in Nicaragua 
related a horrifying story about the killings. The woman 
recalled low flying planes which started firing at the civilians, 
and struck her daughter. When the woman looked, she "saw only 
the heart and intestines of my daughter. She was broken in 
pieces, destroyed.,,1ro As the Sandinista offensive against 
Somoza increased, so too did the atrocities of the National 
Guard. 
Even with another report of violations, the U.s. once again 
reversed its policy and aided Somoza. In February, the Post 
reported that the administration planned on cutting off relations 
with Nicaragua, but instead decided to employ less drastic 
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measures. Sanctions, basically cutting the staff at the embassy 
in half, simply resulted in "an ineffective slap on the wrist .. 
" The mild sanction resulted from pressure from Congress, 
spearheaded again by Charles Wilson, who threatened to hold up 
the Panama Canal treaties, and cut aid to other countries if 
Carter broke off relations with Nicaragua. 171 The Carter 
administration was hand-cuffed in Nicaragua because of other 
interests. 
William LeoGrande points out that Washington Intelligence 
sources predicted that the National Guard could defeat any 
Sandinista offensive. Thus, a Somoza government until 1981 
looked more attractive to Washington than any situation involving 
the Sandinistas. 1n Consistent with this argument, the 
administration again aided the dictator by reversing an earlier 
decision, and allowing a $66 million International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) loan for Nicaragua without any objection. 1n 
The administration's predictions proved incorrect. In June 
of 1979, the Sandinistas launched a "final offensive" against 
Somoza. Any chance for a final push of U.S. support exploded on 
June 20, 1979, as ABC television correspondent Bill Stewart, was 
forced to his knees by a National Guard soldier, and shot in cold 
blood through the head. Unbeknownst to the soldier, Stewart's 
camera crew filmed the entire incident. The U.S. saw on 
television for the first time what Nicaraguans had endured for 
over forty years. This video "did more to injure Somoza's 
reputation around the world, even among conservatives, than 
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perhaps any single incident in the decades-long family rule. 1I 
Finally convinced that Somoza's days were nUmbered, the u.s. 
called for an emergency meeting of the OAS. The purpose was to 
try and impose a moderate solution, and avoid a Sandinista 
takeover. The u.s. proposed the creation of an interim 
government, an OAS peacekeeping force, and an international 
relief effort. The OAS rejected the administration's proposal, 
calling for Somoza's immediate resignation, a democratic 
government composed of representatives from the opposition 
groups, and free elections. The Sandinista junta (which included 
Velleity Chamorro, the widow of Pedro Joaquin) approved the 
resolution.1~ On July 17, 1979, Somoza fled, thus ending the 
forty-five year dynasty. 
When Carter assumed office, he had not exactly envisioned a 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Following Somoza's 
overthrow, Nicaragua lay in shambles. The economy as well as 
human lives had suffered devastation. Although Carter requested 
it, Congress balked at sending immediate aid. Congress did not 
want to see another country fall to communism, as Cuba had in the 
1960's. Needing immediate aid, Nicaragua reached an agreement 
with the soviet Union, which pledged assistance. Refusing aid on 
the grounds of communism, congress left Nicaragua with no other 
choice, but to seek Soviet assistance. 
In November of 1980, Ronald Reagan won the u.s. presidency. 
Upon taking the oath of Office, one of Reagan's main priorities 
included weakening the Sandinista government. He began arming 
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opposition groups, including a group known as the Contras, to 
fight against the Sandinistas. Congress eventually prohibited 
any Contra aid. This presented merely an obstacle for Reagan who 
employed the CIA covertly to aid the Contras without the 
knowledge of Congress or the American people. In 1985 Reagan 
authorized Israel to begin selling u.s. arms to Iran, for the 
purpose of releasing seven American hostages. This money for the 
arms, conveniently went to feeding, clothing, and arming the 
Contras, again without public knowledge. The party ended in 
1987, when Oliver North's televised confessions took place during 
the Iran-Contra Affair hearings. This did not improve U.S.­
Nicaraguan relations. 
Jimmy carter's Nicaragua policy was destined to fail. He 
valued human rights, yet preferred Somoza to the Sandinistas. By 
the earthquake of 1972, the Nicaraguan people began to really see 
the corruption of the Somoza dynasty, which increased Sandinista 
activities. When Carter took office, however, the Sandinista 
threat still was not perceived as strong enough to cause great 
concern for the administration. 
The watershed came with the assassination of Chamorro. A 
civil war broke out, and the strength of the Sandinistas began to 
show. Carter knew about the documented abuses of human rights, 
yet his administration did not want to see Nicaragua fall to the 
communists, and thus continued to aid Somoza and the National 
Guard. Besides the communist threat, congressional pressure to 
cut off other aid if Nicaraguan aid ended, convinced the 
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administration to simply continue aiding the dictator. For 
Carter, other issues seemed more important. 
The Carter letter ended any chance for a foreign policy 
based on human rights. The letter forced the u.s. to take a 
definite stance toward Nicaragua, and the increasing strength of 
the Sandinistas made Somoza appear as the only acceptable option. 
In addition, the letter and its subsequent leak, also confirmed 
the fact that the Carter administration's foreign policy was 
contradictory in that human rights only pertained to certain 
situations. 
Bill stewart's murder finally convinced Washington that 
Somoza had to go. Unfortunately, thousands of Nicaraguans had 
died, but it took the death of one American newsman to silence 
even the pro-Somoza forces in Congress. Yet during the mediation 
talks, the Carter administration pushed for a government to 
include the National Guard, the perpetrators of forty years of 
human rights violations. This ultimately demonstrates that the 
foreign policy of the Carter administration towards Nicaragua was 
not based on human rights, but rather on preventing a communist 
government from taking power. 
Lessons can be drawn from Nicaragua. First of all, 
presidents eventually pay when their experts are ignored. In 
this manner Brzezinski did not serve Carter well. He put his own 
interests ahead of Carter's, and this led to a major blunder in 
policy. Second, if the U.s. government plans on forcing a leader 
out of power, it better know what to replace him with. Carter 
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did not want to see Somoza in power, but he did not provide any 
acceptable alternative. When crisis erupted, Carter was stuck 
with Somoza. Finally, understanding the history of a situation 
is necessary to understand present conditions. Prior to Carter, 
the Somoza regime enjoyed forty years of support. certain 
members in congress did not want this to end, and threatened to 
impede passage of legislation deemed more important to Carter if 
this occurred. Carter underestimated this force. 
Maybe the united states is, as Robert Pastor's book 
suggests, "Condemned to Repetition" in third world countries. 
Perhaps we will continue to intervene in third-world-countries 
whenever revolution occurs. Or perhaps someday we will actually 
allow a country; to decide its own fate. After all, the prototype 
for democracy is the united states, and do not our roots lie in 
revolution? 
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